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Abstract: Transhumanism is a challenging movement that invites us to rethink what 
defines humanity, including what we value and regret the most about our existence. 
Vulnerability is a key concept that require thorough philosophical scrutiny concerning 
transhumanist proposals. Vulnerability can refer to a universal condition of human 
life (ontological vulnerability) or, rather, to the specific exposure to certain harms due 
to particular situations (social vulnerability). Even if we are all vulnerable in the first 
sense, there are also different sources and levels of vulnerability depending on con-
crete social circumstances. Recently, Michael Hauskeller (2019) argued about a fun-
damental incompatibility between transhumanism and vulnerability. He understands 
vulnerability as an existential category, linked to woundability and mortality. This idea 
is akin to ontological vulnerability, but it does not notice some important features 
of social vulnerability. On the other side, transhumanism is a complex and non-ho-
mogeneous movement. Here we distinguish between a strong and a weak version of 
transhumanism. We will propose that the salience of vulnerability is only diminished 
In Defense of Posthuman Vulnerability
BELÉN LIEDO FERNÁNDEZ, JON RUEDA
9(1)/2021216
B E L É N L I E D O F E R N Á N D E Z, J O N R U E DA
in the radical one, while a moderate version can reconcile vulnerability with human 
enhancement. Thus, vulnerability, a concept that has recently gained much importance 
as an anthropological category in contemporary ethics, is not necessarily at odds with 
any transhumanist project.
Keywords: Care; Enhancing Vulnerability; Human Enhancement; Posthuman; Transhu-
manism; Vulnerability.
1. Introduction 
Transhumanism is a challenging movement that invites us to rethink hu-
manity, including what we value and disesteem the most about our existence. 
Vulnerability is a key concept that requires thorough philosophical scrutiny 
concerning transhumanist proposals. Recently, Michael Hauskeller (2019) 
presented an original contribution to the debate about transhumanism and 
vulnerability. He formulated the concept of ‘existential vulnerability’, which 
evokes themes such as human mortality and fragility, thereby pointing to 
what ancient Greeks called ephemeroi—i.e. those who live one day. According 
to him, transhumanism neglects and pretends to defeat human vulnerability, 
which makes him suspicious about both the radical life extension and the 
extreme enhancements that this movement vehemently defends.
Needless to say, vulnerability is not the only human existential value that 
is allegedly being eroded by transhumanist ideals and by the emergence of 
new technological advances (see Birnbacher 2010), and yet recent literature 
has tended to focus in the idea that transhumanist projects menace the 
precious human vulnerability (Asla 2019, Cannavò 2019, Hauskeller 2019, 
Llano 2019, Woollard 2019).1 It seems necessary, therefore, to give weight 
to the question of to what extent transhumanism defies human beings 
1 In addition to Hauskeller’s work, in a former monograph on Transhumanism of Scientia et 
Fides two articles mentioned in passing this topic. Asla (2019) pointed out, from a Thom-
istic perspective, that human vulnerability is intrinsically ligated to corporeity, i.e. our 
natural vulnerability stems from our embodied existence, which only the most radical 
attempts of transhumanism could undermine. Moreover, Woollard (2019) vindicates the 
relevance of vulnerability in its relationship with suffering from a philosophy of cancer 
point of view. 
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as vulnerable beings. Moreover, we should take seriously the question of 
whether prospective transhuman or posthuman existence would represent 
a significant decrease in what we understand as vulnerability.
In this article, we claim both that transhumanism can be compatible 
with a curtailment of certain vulnerabilities and that vulnerability is an 
ineradicable feature of any kind of human or posthuman existence. The 
article is divided in four parts. First, we will clarify the concept of vulner-
ability addressing the most significant theories that have focused on its 
ethical importance in the last decades. Our characterization recognizes 
that vulnerability is a relevant part of the human condition, but we do not 
consider that this can be an argument per se against enhancing and changing 
the human species. After that, we distinguish between a strong and a weak 
version of transhumanism. We will propose that the salience of vulnerability 
is only diminished in the radical one, while a moderate version can reconcile 
vulnerability with human enhancement. Finally, we will conclude that it 
is possible to defend a vulnerability-friendly transhumanism, in which 
vulnerability turns into an inspiring category (not an insurmountable 
constraint) for human enhancement projects. 
2. Rethinking vulnerability: conceptual clarifications 
Vulnerability is a concept increasingly employed in contemporary ethics 
discourse. Etymologically, as Hauskeller (2019) points out, it refers to the 
possibility of being wounded (Latin vulnus means ‘wound’), thereby evoking 
the idea of openness to harm and of, eventually, death. In the last decades, 
vulnerability has been a category present in public policy documents and 
ethical guidelines, such as the well-known Belmont Report (1978) or the Euro-
pean Commission’s four Basic Principles in Bioethics and Biolaw (1995–1998, 
Rendtorff 2002). However, despite this growing attention to the issue, 
commentators (Bracken Roche et al. 2017, Ten Have 2017) usually agree 
on the lack of systematic and comprehensive academic account of human 
vulnerability and the need of further clarification on the topic. According 
to Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds (2014), the most detailed analyses of the 
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concept of vulnerability have been produced within three domains: bioethics 
(see, for example, Kipnis 2001, Luna 2006 or Ten Have 2016); feminist ethics, 
especially the ethics of care paradigm (see Kittay 1999, Fineman 2004 and 
2008, Held 2006, or Tronto 1993 and 2013) and postmodern political thought, 
which links vulnerability with other key concepts, such as corporeity and 
precariousness (Butler 2004). Vulnerability is thus a work-in-progress an-
thropological, ethical and political category which is set to become pivotal 
for the proliferating discourses concerning the human condition.
In his article Ephemeroi – Human Vulnerability, Transhumanism, and the 
Meaning of Life (2019), Michael Hauskeller employs the idea of human vulner-
ability as a central account on his critique against transhumanism, focusing on 
what he calls “existential vulnerability”. Indeed, the concept of vulnerability 
he is describing is rooted in the existential experience of being human. He 
posits that only the beings which exist (in a philosophical, existential sense) 
can in fact be vulnerable. In other words, vulnerability has to do with being 
conscious of one’s own fragility, one’s own temporality, and the identity as 
a being similar but different from other beings, who are also vulnerable. 
It is possible to identify three main elements within Hauskeller’s con-
cept of vulnerability: (i) the possibility of being wounded, which is linked 
to mortality; (ii) self-perception as a source of vulnerability and (iii) the 
importance of the relationships with others. So, first of all vulnerability 
corresponds to the possibility of being wounded. In this sense, Hauskeller 
understands vulnerability as a “function of our mortality” (10-11); in some 
way, all harms we can suffer remind us of the inevitable truth of death and 
take us away from fantasies of omnipotence. 
Secondly, Hauskeller highlights the importance of self-perception of 
vulnerability. Not everything that can be damaged is vulnerable. Life can 
only be taken away from living beings; and, moreover, these beings need to 
be at least to some extent aware of their existence, which makes them value 
it. Mortality, a central component of Hauskeller’s vulnerability account, does 
not mean only the possibility of ceasing to exist in the world (a rock can 
also crash and “lose” its previous way of being in the world); it also implies 
an acknowledgment of this possibility that deploys on the course of life. As 
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Hauskeller shows, such acknowledgment is qualitatively different from any 
other. It is a radical existential condition for human beings and it involves 
a serious difficulty for being consequently assumed, because it is nothing 
less than the fundamental menace to our being. That difficulty is what can 
explain that we sometimes behave as if we or others were non-vulnerable, 
even if this is a blatant fantasy. 
The importance of the vulnerability of others, not only one’s own, is what 
leads us to the third point. Hauskeller (2019, 14) emphasizes the problem 
of the absence of others’ concerns about one’s own death. If nobody cares 
about me, even if I do, my existence loses something intuitively valuable. As 
we will see, the interdependence between human beings is a central issue 
in recent vulnerability literature—vulnerability indicates that we radically 
need each other to sustain a valuable life and a decent death. 
In vulnerability studies, it is typical to distinguish between two different 
notions.2 On the one hand, ontological vulnerability is related to what makes 
us aware of the shared, universal imperfection and fragility of all human 
beings (Nussbaum 1986, Butler 2004, Fineman 2004 and 2008). This main 
idea denies the misleading anthropological conceptions that presume that 
some way of total independence is possible within human life. Martha 
Albertson Fineman (2008, 1) states that “vulnerability is—and should be 
understood to be—universal and constant, inherent in the human condition.” 
On the other hand, social vulnerability focuses on different levels of 
vulnerability, that is, the variation of the dangers one is exposed to, due to 
the specific context she is immersed in. Usually, the situation experienced 
by each person is related to socio-economic factors—e.g., some are more 
exposed to poverty or violence due to race discrimination. Following this 
view, we can talk about “vulnerable groups”, that is, people whose situations 
2 In a different terminology than the one utilized here, Onora O’Neill (1996) distinguish-
es between persistent vulnerability and variable or selective vulnerability. There is also 
a different but equally dualistic categorization between intrinsic and contingent vulnera-
bility, that is, the difference between an inevitable and “natural” vulnerability and anoth-
er one caused by contingent social factors (Schroeder & Gefenas 2009). Sometimes this 
categorization overlaps the main one between ontological and social vulnerability, but we 
will not refer to it in order to clarify our argument.
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make them more likely to suffer certain harms compared with the rest of 
the population. Some major works on this field have been developed by 
Florencia Luna (2006)3 and Robert E. Goodin (1985), among others. One of 
the most influential definitions of vulnerability of this sort first appeared in 
the CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving 
Human Subjects (1993). In this document, vulnerable people are character-
ized as “those incapable of protecting their own interests” (CIOMS 2002, 
Guideline 13, unprefixed pages).
That said, Hauskeller’s existential vulnerability seems to be akin to the 
idea of ontological vulnerability. He focuses on the shared, intrinsic fragility 
of human beings qua human beings. In doing so, he unmasks the quests for 
achieving invulnerability as what they are: incompatible with our human 
condition. This is a common objective in ontological vulnerability literature, 
and it can help us to build more rigorous and fruitful anthropological models. 
Indeed, as critics have shown (Fineman 2008, Delgado Rodríguez 2017), 
the “vulnerable groups” view implies the risk of misunderstanding what is 
like to be vulnerable. If some people are part of the “vulnerable groups”, 
the rest do not; it can lead us to the mistake of conceiving non-members 
of vulnerable collectives as homogeneously invulnerable. This is why 
becoming aware of the shared vulnerability of all humanity is so relevant, 
neglecting those anthropological conceptions that presume some kind of 
invulnerability or full-blown independence in human condition. 
However, we cannot deny that some people, as a matter of fact, are 
more exposed to certain harms than others. For example, being a person 
with a functional diversity implies that the opportunities for freedom of 
movement are reduced in comparison with a person with average level 
capacities. Being a woman exposes oneself to different acts of violence, 
due to gender, than being a man does. Being a child involves a very high 
level of dependence on adults, which implies a great vulnerability to their 
3 Luna (2009) proposed one of the most refined analysis of social vulnerability. She defends 
the use of the “layers” metaphor instead of the “labels” one, in order to avoid some of the 
problems that arise from characterize certain groups as “essentially” vulnerable (stigma-
tization, paternalism, marginalization). 
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(good and bad) decisions. We need an account of vulnerability that dis-
tinguishes between the different situations a person can be embedded in, 
recognizing the diversity of human life. Vulnerability is not just mortality, 
but also the possibility of being harmed in physical and emotional ways; 
it is the recognition of our shared interdependence4 as human beings. We 
will all die someday, but the quality of the life that precedes death can vary 
significantly, and an adequate account of human vulnerability can help us 
to recognize the factors that make some lives more vulnerable than others 
and to work for diminishing these inequalities. 
Hauskeller is right on the relevance of undertaking the universal vulner-
able condition inherent to human life, and we also concur with the idea that 
any futuristic project regarding human species, as the transhumanist project 
is, could never deny this fact if it wants to be a feasible and worth-pursuing 
proposal. Yet, we do not agree that there is an incompatibility between the 
transhumanist aspirations per se and a rigorous acknowledgment of human 
vulnerability. Instead, we advocate for a conception of vulnerability which 
directly links human condition with the aspiration of reducing harm and 
precariousness in human lives. This aspiration has traditionally been pursued 
by medicine through its therapeutic endeavor. Even though vulnerability 
is commonly related to disease, there is a significant difference between 
a healthy human (potentially wounded) and an infirm one (actually wound-
ed). Whether the transhumanist purpose of human enhancement—namely, 
improving the capabilities of healthy people by technological means—can 
also be aligned with this aspiration will be addressed in the next section. 
Focusing on an idea of vulnerability capable of assuming both the 
shared fragility of human life and the different threats one can confront 
depending on particular situations, we glimpse a common tendency of 
human history: the pursuit of diminishing harm and peril. Vulnerability 
means interdependence; when we realize that we radically need each other 
4 The relationship between “vulnerability” and “dependency” is not an obvious one. We 
have no enough space to develop this issue in here, but we align with the idea of inter-
dependence as a consequence of vulnerability. For further exploration on the topic, see 
Kittay (1999) and Dodds (2014).
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to survive (and, also, to have a valuable life), we associate to create safer and 
more enjoyable ways-of-life in which we can better get over the harms we 
are exposed to due to our frail condition. Of course, we can never definitely 
defeat imperfection; at the very least, one day we will die. But this does not 
mean we do not strive to make our lives more long-lasting, comfortable and 
secure. As stated by Alfredo Marcos (2016), a responsible acknowledgment 
of vulnerability should avoid denial but also conformism: “this vulnerability 
must be recognized […] and at the same time mitigated” (Marcos 2016, 43). 
Some authors have proposed the idea of shared vulnerability as a fruitful 
basis for solidarity and equality. Judith Butler (2004) defends the potential 
of the awareness of common vulnerability to encourage empathy and asso-
ciation. Vulnerability is, in her view, a condition inherent to being human. 
That does not mean that all of us are exposed to the same perils; rather than 
that, it helps us understand different situations experienced by different 
people. Eva F. Kittay (2005) fosters an account of human dignity rooted in 
the shared vulnerability and the consequent common need for care, namely, 
our interdependence. Since we are all fragile (on different levels depending 
on moments and situations) and we are all also needy from others’ care, we 
are all equally worthy and we have a balanced responsibility regarding others’ 
needs. Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds (2014) see vulnerability as a conse-
quence of three aspects of the human condition: embodiment, emotional 
and psychological dependence on others, and exposure to conditions of the 
(natural or not) environment. Ten Have (2016) also underlies the positive 
aspects of vulnerability, related to openness, potentiality to change, and 
basis for the development of valuable relationships. 
Specifically, Mark Coeckelbergh’s (2011) insights on posthuman vul-
nerability can shed light on the possibility of understanding a version of 
transhumanism compatible with the acknowledgment of human vulnera-
bility. Coeckelbergh highlights the unavoidable human vulnerability and 
denies the feasibility of a version of transhumanism that intends to reach 
invulnerability. Still, he does not infer from it that the transhumanist project 
by itself is naive or impossible. Instead, he identifies different kinds and 
sources of vulnerability, showing that a posthuman future could possibly 
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avoid some of them, but probably will face some different ones; and, also, 
defending that we cannot possibly escape from some of the actual ones. 
As he states:
Vulnerability is not a matter of ‘external’ dangers that threaten or tyrannize us, 
but that have nothing to do with what we are; instead, it is bound up with our 
relational, technological and transient kind of being – human or posthuman. 
(Coeckelbergh 2011, 8).
Transhumanist projects need to take a serious account of human vulnera-
bility. Yet, this does not mean to renounce the ambitious aim of reducing 
risks and harms through technological development, even if in the very 
long run it changes what we presently are as a species. This means, on the 
contrary, that we need to interrogate ourselves about what type of source of 
peril are we going to tackle and how each endeavor can best meet objectives 
aligned with aspirations of equality and justice.
Therefore, the concept of vulnerability we have developed here could 
be compatible with some versions of transhumanism. It is a formulation 
that (a) understands both universal and contextual condition of vulnerable 
human life; (b) takes vulnerability as an opportunity to become aware of the 
radical interdependence intrinsic to human life; (c) implies the tentative 
legitimacy of any project which aims to make life the less hazardous and 
the less insecure as possible, looking for the best quality of life that we can 
reasonably achieve; (d) trusts in the creative capacity of human beings 
to make life better, taking vulnerability as an inevitable flip side of this 
freedom; and (e) defends that even if we are aware that total invulnerability 
is an impossible ideal, we may well pursue a world with less vulnerability, 
knowing that we would maybe be vulnerable in some new different ways. 
3. Two interpretations of transhumanism
There is no doubt that transhumanism is often perceived as paradigm 
incompatible with a vulnerable form of life such as the human. As Coeck-
elbergh (2011, 7) said: “the transhumanist project can be interpreted as 
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a particularly hostile response to (human) vulnerability that probably has 
no parallel in human history.” Yet, transhumanism is manifestly a plural 
movement that sometimes diverges when it comes to its many theoretical 
positions, practical interests and particular controversies (Diéguez 2017). It 
is important to note, starting from such premise, that there is not necessarily 
a unanimous stance about the importance (or insignificance) of vulnerability 
in the discussion of transcending technologically human limitations. 
For that reason, a fine-grained analysis is required to avoid lumping 
together different conceptions. In this section, we will address a strong 
and a weak version of transhumanism. We think that Hauskeller and other 
commentators engage in a radical sort of transhumanism when it comes to 
analyze vulnerability. We will concede that in the strong version the salience 
of vulnerability is substantially diminished. For us, this downplaying of 
human vulnerability is difficult to accept. We will show, moreover, that 
some degree of vulnerability would be an ineradicable feature of posthuman 
existence, as some authors had suggested (Bostrom 2008b, Birnbacher 2010, 
Coeckelbergh 2011). In short, the aspiration to eliminate vulnerability is not 
only normatively problematic, but also unachievable. On the other hand, 
we will present a weak version of transhumanism in which the significance 
of vulnerability is not denied, but instead becomes itself an impulse of 
change to make human lives better, even if it drives humanity to enhance 
its biological condition and, consequently, to accelerate the conversion 
into a new species.
The strong version of transhumanism 
To give us an idea of the prospects of a sort of radical version of transhu-
manism we shall pay attention to the next fragments, written by two of the 
most prominent representatives of this movement. Consider the following 
one, from Max More:
Mother Nature, truly we are grateful for what you have made us. […] However, 
with all due respect, we must say that you have in many ways done a poor 
job with the human constitution. You have made us vulnerable to disease 
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and damage. You compel us to age and die – just as we’re beginning to attain 
wisdom. […] What you have made us is glorious, yet deeply flawed. […] We have 
decided that it is time to amend the human constitution. […] We will no longer 
tolerate the tyranny of aging and death […] We will expand our perceptual 
range […] We will improve on our neural organization and capacity, expanding 
our working memory, and enhancing our intelligence. […] We will take charge 
over our genetic programming and achieve mastery over our biological, and 
neurological processes. […] While we pursue mastery of our own biochemistry 
[…] These amendments to our constitution will transition us from a human to 
a posthuman condition […] (More 2013 [1999], 449-459). 
Let’s now consider this one, written by Nick Bostrom:
Have you ever known a moment of bliss? […] If you have experienced such a mo-
ment, experienced the best type of such a moment, […] And yet, what you had in 
your best moment is not close to what I have now – a beckoning scintilla at most. 
[…] My consciousness is wide and deep, my life long. […] The transformation is 
profound, but it can be as gradual as the growth that made the baby you were 
into the adult you think you are. […] I urge on you nothing more, nothing less, 
than reconfigured physical situation. […] Secure life! […] Upgrade cognition! […] 
Elevate well-being! […] Pleasure! A few grains of this magic ingredient are worth 
more than a king’s treasure, and we have it aplenty here in Utopia. […] Utopia is 
the hope that the scattered fragments of good that we come across from time 
to time in our lives can be put together, one day, to reveal the shape of a new 
kind of life. The kind of life that yours should have been. […] Human life, at its 
best, is fantastic. I’m asking you to create something even greater (Bostrom 
2008a, 1–7, italics in original source).
The former texts are noteworthy examples of this revolutionary version of 
transhumanism. Letter to Mother Nature (More 2013 [1999]) and Letter from 
Utopia (Bostrom 2008a) are passionate missives that display a visionary 
attitude about a possible idyllic human future. Transhumanism is, in this 
sense, a movement that exhibits remarkable utopian tendencies (Hauskeller 
2014). It is interesting to note that in those utopian visions it underlies 
a conceptual devaluation of the human species, in which the brighter the 
posthuman future seems to be, the bleaker our current existence looks 
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(Hauskeller 2012, 44–46). Consequently, this theoretical framework not only 
points to the foreseeable splendor that a radical technological enhancement 
could bring about, but it also intends to show the deficiencies of the human 
constitution that we should overcome. 
Transhumanism is, moreover, a notorious future-oriented movement. 
One of the paradigms that transhumanism embraces is longtermism, that is, 
directing our current actions in consideration of their impact on the very 
distant future. The far-reaching evolutionary stages that should be pursued 
start in the human and continue with the transhuman until arriving to the 
posthuman. Transhumans are considerably enhanced humans, who still are 
not far from its predecessors, but who exceed them remarkably in cognitive, 
emotional and physical abilities and in health span.5 In other words, they are 
considered “transitional humans” because they are a halfway evolutionary 
point between humans and posthumans (More 1993; Porter 2017, 238). 
Posthuman existence is the real aim of transhumanism. Radical technological 
enhancements would lead to a substantially different form of being, whose 
way of life is difficult to imagine for humans (Bostrom 2008a, 2008b). 
Posthumans, according to Bostrom (2008b, 108), greatly surpass hu-
man general capacities such as in healthspan, cognition, and emotion. 
Furthermore, if irremediable natural death lurks behind every human 
life, posthumans6 seem to be indifferent to aging and to the biological 
vulnerabilities that lead to disease and to decease. Another main proposal 
of transhumanism is mind uploading (More, 1993). This idea consists in 
5 Note that this type of variation could still be intra-specific in some cases: the sapiens 
of the Pleistocene could see contemporary humans like transhumans. Of course, draw-
ing the line between intra-specific enhancement and species-changing enhancement is 
a challenging controversy that, however, escapes the objectives of this article. This puz-
zling issue leads to a kind of identity problem: for us, humans, it is difficult to guess what 
would be valuable for a hypothetical novel species resulting from a radical transhumanist 
endeavor. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on this topic.
6 This sense of the word ‘posthuman’, as may have been noticed, is quite different from 
the use that make some authors rooted in the postmodern feminist tradition, such as 
Halberstam & Livingston (1995), Hayles (1999), Braidotti (2013), etc. According to them, 
we are already posthumans in the sense that we are not anymore the ‘human’ subject that 
the so-considered traditional anthropocentric, sexist, specist, and racist humanism has 
constructed. See Rueda (2020a) for some differences and similarities between transhu-
manism and philosophical posthumanism. 
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uploading the human mind to a cybernetic substrate to evade biological 
death and to achieve a sort of digital amortality.7 As Bostrom (2008a, 3) 
affirms, human body is a deathtrap. Human body is, moreover, an evident 
source of pain and suffering due to its physiological nature—an inescapable 
characteristic of every sentient animal. Accordingly, David Pearce (2015 
[1995]) proposed from a negative utilitarian transhumanist perspective to 
abolish suffering in all sentient beings through genetic engineering and 
nanotechnologies. Thus, Pearce’s posthumans will have completely excluded 
all kind of suffering from their lives.
In this context, two preliminary consequences must be noted in rela-
tion to vulnerability. First, the ideal that guides transhumanist ambitions 
(i.e. the posthuman) represents a type of existence in which human-type 
bodily vulnerabilities are substantially diminished. If human existential 
and ontological vulnerability consists in being woundable, frail and mortal 
(Hauskeller 2019), posthumans can be considered without a hint of doubt 
as less vulnerable beings. In addition, if transhumanism is an evolutionary 
project, and it certainly is (More 2013), then the decrease in vulnerability will 
inevitably be gradual. Hence, transhumans are more ontologically vulnerable 
in comparison with posthumans, but less vulnerable than humans. It is 
important to acknowledge that vulnerability, even in its ontological sense, is 
not an all or nothing category, but a scalar concept with different grey colors. 
Second, transhumanist projects might affect what we previously have 
characterized as social vulnerability. Many authors have warned about the 
perils of societal disruption, the increase of inequalities and the creation of 
new hierarchies since the beginning of the human enhancement debate. For 
instance, the development of genetic engineering might lead to the creation 
of a New Breed (Harris 1992), a population divide between the GenRich and 
7 A common mistake is to label this aspiration as a search for ‘immortality’, which intrin-
sically means the impossibility of death. Posthumans, even if they are uploaded into 
a virtual cloud, an android or a supercomputer, will still have present the possibility of 
death, either as an optional choice or as an external menace. See Coeckelbergh (2011) 
for some external risks that make posthuman existence still vulnerable to death. See also 
García-Barranquero (2021) for another perspective on the “immortalist fallacy” of trans-
humanist’s mind uploading.
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the GenPoor (Silver 1997), “a full-scale class war” between the enhanced 
and the not enhanced (Fukuyama 2002, 16), or even to the violent genocide 
of the inferior human species (Annas et al. 2002). Although most empirical 
predictions about the prospective uncertain impact of genetic enhancement 
technologies at a societal level are contestable, one must take account of 
the fear that such interventions might have grave deleterious effects, such 
as unequal promotion and disruption of the social equilibrium (Llano 2019, 
43; Cannavò 2019, 12). 
Therefore, it is fundamental to bear in mind that enhancement tech-
nologies may create new kinds of social vulnerabilities or that may deepen 
the current ones. In the hypothetical and speculative scenario that radical 
enhancement will lead to a future conflict between different moral statuses 
and potential diverging interests between the long-standing sapiens and its 
“ungrateful successors” (either transhumans or posthumans), the notion 
of social vulnerability would become more prominent precisely because of 
its relational and context-sensitive dimension. Human enhancement might 
create in this sense some vulnerable collectives. Of course, this is not an 
unbeatable argument against transhumanism (inasmuch as it is ultimately 
a solvable problem) but rather the acknowledgment that transhumanist 
proposals might have an impact that goes beyond the ontological aspect 
of vulnerability, reaching the social one. 
At this point, it seems clear that in the strong version of transhuman-
ism both ontological and social vulnerability have a deserved place in the 
debate. Radical transhumanism entails a diminished sense of ontological 
vulnerability, especially a decrease in human-type ontological vulnerabili-
ties. Posthumans would then be, all things considered, less vulnerable than 
humans. However, the question of whether posthuman existence would 
exclude any kind of vulnerability remains to be solved. In the previous section 
we have suggested, following Coeckelbergh (2011), that it is highly doubtful 
that such would be the case. Certainly, posthumans will be vulnerable, but 
in a very different way than us. In this respect, Nick Bostrom (2008b, 132) 
stated that “[a] posthuman could be vulnerable, dependent, and limited.” 
Others like Birnbacher had pointed out in the same vein that:
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Universal properties like embodiment, mortality or vulnerability are too unspecif-
ic to single human nature out from the “natures” of other kinds of animals, and 
they are unlikely to be transcended even by the wildest posthumanist dreams. 
Even if the life-span of a “posthuman” humanity exceeds that of present 
humanity by a considerable time or if their health and safety far exceed ours, 
“posthumans” will still be embodied, mortal and vulnerable (Birnbacher 2010, 
102, italic in original source).
In conclusion, there is not a category such as ‘ontological invulnerability’ 
that posthumans could achieve. The quest for posthumanity has been 
coupled sometimes with a longing for perfection. Indeed, some critics have 
overstated the relevance of the term ‘perfection’ in the general debate of 
human enhancement (Kass 2003; Sandel 2007). Nevertheless, transhu-
manists seldom (or never) use the word ‘perfection’ to describe posthuman 
existence, probably because it is an extremely vague concept. Perfection, 
whatever it means, should not be used concerning human enhancement if 
it is characterized as invulnerability. Posthumans would neither be perfect 
nor invulnerable. Would anyone say that the gods of Olympus were not 
vulnerable? No doubt they were vulnerable in their own way. Vulnerability 
is not a human-exclusive category. Still, to what extent the decrease of post-
human vulnerability might be close to zero is an open question that would 
require further examination, a task that exceeds the aims of this article. 
The weak version of transhumanism 
The yearning for reducing different types of vulnerabilities is part and parcel 
of human history. In this section, we will offer another interpretation of 
transhumanism that we believe can be compatible with both (a) the aspi-
ration of mitigating certain vulnerabilities (b) and the acknowledgement 
that vulnerability is a valuable component of human and other forms of 
life—including transhuman and posthuman ones. We will first start char-
acterizing this kind of weak transhumanism that is reconcilable with the 
saliency of vulnerability. 
Transhumanism can contribute to the long historical (but not necessarily 
progressive) continuum that assumes the societal importance of taking over 
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human vulnerabilities. However, this version should be devoid of some of 
the excesses that we think are present in the radical version—and risk to 
be also present in the moderate one. Three components should be specially 
excluded: (i) evolutionary eagerness, (ii) high-tech enhancement fetishism, 
and (iii) utopian commitments. But in addition to these shortcomings, there 
are some lessons to be learned. 
First, the evolutionary eagerness that transhumanism exhibits should 
be abandoned. Although the pace of natural evolution is unhurried and 
its random mutations do not care about human welfare, the prospect of 
an overarching conversion into a novel transhuman or posthuman species 
is self-defeating in the near and the medium-term. It might be possible, if 
so, only in the very long-term future, but there is the risk of leaving a part 
of humanity behind. At the moment we only can decide the first steps that 
might lead to that process (see Jonas, 1984 [1979]). On the other hand, the 
deflation of self-directed evolution does not mean that we should reject bi-
ological and genetic enhancements. The cumulative impact of enhancement 
technologies may accelerate, in fact, the creation of a novel descendant of 
the human species. After all, Homo sapiens is not the end-point of evolution, 
but it is a transient being that in some time is inevitably doomed to perish, 
like any other biological species. The case against ‘altering’ the species, 
moreover, goes hand in hand with the inconsistency of ‘alter-ing’ form of 
lives that are in constant change, as Juengst had exceptionally manifested: 
Species are not static collections of organisms that can be ‘preserved’ against 
change like a can of fruit; they wax and wane with every birth and death and their 
genetic complexions shift across time and space. In our case, almost everything 
we do as humans affects that process (Juengst 2009, 50).
Second, we should avoid what we call the high-tech enhancement fetishism. 
The technophilic attitude of the strong version of transhumanism may lead 
to a bias in favor of cutting-edge technological interventions. Biomedical 
enhancements need not have any priority per se over other types of actions 
that improve the well-being of the human population. Throughout history, 
the most effective and widely accepted practices and institutions concerning 
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the care of human vulnerabilities have primarily been environmental and 
social interventions, such as family caring, architecture, traditional medicine, 
cooperative economy, and so on. This entails that cultural inheritance had 
changed our biological constitution and our genome, that is, “we have been 
enhancing human nature for donkeys’ years without shivering much at 
all” (Lewens 2015, 17). Now, novel technologies might make a significant 
contribution to that process. Several emerging enhancement technologies, 
however, raise legitimate precautionary concerns. The more uncertain the 
potential risks and benefits of these technologies are, the more important 
traditional environmental arrangements will continue to be considered. 
Again, this does not preclude that the potential of environmental and social 
practices sometimes is limited. On some occasions, we should consider 
making changes in our biological constitution that go beyond therapeutic 
interventions. 
Third, the utopian tendency of transhumanism should be tempered. 
Hauskeller has identified the characteristics of that trend elsewhere (2012, 
2014). The siren songs of progress can sink reasonable biotechnological 
proposals for change. Defending that “enhancement (in terms of change) is 
better in and of itself” had been so-called a progress bias8 (Hofmann 2017, 
8). Another difficulty lies in what changes of the human constitution are 
for the better. As it is often said, “all progress is change, but not all change 
is progress.” It seems to be widely accepted, nevertheless, the importance 
of healing disease, preventing disabilities or, shortly, using gene editing 
to correct single gene disorders, probably because we have a clearer idea 
(compared to the terminological vagueness of ‘enhancement’) of what 
these phenomena are. Surely, the epistemological and ethical challenge of 
the ordinary social indeterminacy of enhancement (either in quantitative 
or qualitative sense) might be overcome. Bioprogressive movements like 
transhumanism can increasingly reach a wider audience about what we 
can accept for ‘enhancements’ and why these changes are for the better. 
8 Hofmann uses that expression in contraposition to the status-quo-bias developed by Bos-
trom and Ord (2006). 
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Accordingly, this weak version of transhumanism might become a can-
didate to be considered in the shared endeavor of taking care of human vul-
nerabilities. This non-radical variant supports two important consideration 
for the ethical relevance of vulnerability: (a) its role triggering valuable 
caring relationships, and (b) recalling the structural social interdependence 
of human and posthuman lives. For the first, consider the following text, 
in which a puzzling fact of vulnerability was anticipated by Parens in the 
dawn of the human enhancement debate:
When we are carried away by our benevolent desires to reduce the suffering of 
vulnerable people and, less benevolently, their cost to society, we forget that the 
vulnerability of others not only burdens us (though it surely does so), but also 
elicits from us the awesome capacity to care for others. Although—and I cannot 
be too emphatic about this—it would be a profound mistake to romanticize the 
need to care for vulnerable others and the need of vulnerable others to be cared 
for, it would be equally mistaken to ignore the goodness that those relationships 
can possess (Parens 1995, 147).
The enduring struggle with vulnerabilities is paradoxical because, on the 
one hand, in our attempt to alleviate them we are implicitly acknowledging 
that they burden both the vulnerable individual and society and, on the 
other hand, we think that something valuable elicits from the fact of taking 
care of vulnerabilities. For Parens (1995), there is goodness in fragility. Yet, 
that goodness is not necessarily conferred by the fact itself of being frail or 
vulnerable. Being severely ill does not bestow a special kind of goodness, it 
rather is a misfortune that hardly anyone wants for themselves. It is also true 
that we allocate a lot of resources to mitigate fragility. However, vulnerability 
is one of the bedrocks of the most meaningful human relationships that we 
establish. Childrearing, caring for the sick, cohabiting with a pet, or helping 
others are intrinsically valuable for a lot of people and those activities are in 
some way trigger out by different types of vulnerability. Human enhancement 
technologies should not diminish, consequently, the human disposition to 
care others (in the broadest sense of the term). It might also be possible 
that in the future some technologies might enhance human disposition to 
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care9 while decreasing the most flagrant vulnerabilities. In short, caring 
should be part of posthuman existence. 
 The second reason is related to the previous one. Care and being cared 
is the acknowledgment of human interdependence. Admittedly, humans are 
not self-sufficient beings. We are vulnerable in part because we depend on 
each other. Certainly, humans are not self-sustaining animals, our survival 
success and our quality of life depends on others. Vulnerability is also the 
basis of other social commitments and institutions10 that make our life worthy. 
Transhumans or posthumans, no matter how many enhancements they accu-
mulate, will surely be beings who live in society. If the posthuman is a kind of 
Robinson Crusoe, it would be a life where many valuable things would be lost. 
Indeed, empowerment does not lead to self-isolation, but to a more robust 
reinforcement of our social bonds. A non-radical variant of transhumanism 
might make compatible the aspiration of using enhancement technologies to 
opening life opportunities (i.e. making people more autonomous in a relational, 
vulnerability-friendly sense) without endorsing the myth of self-sufficiency. 
In the previous section, we have stated that even if enhancements lead 
to ‘transcend’ the human species, our successors will remain vulnerable 
in their own way. In this section, however, we are making a very different 
statement. Here, we are arguing that our potential successors should preserve 
certain kinds of vulnerabilities. Human vulnerabilities deploy valuable caring 
relations and interdependent social infrastructures that our prospective heirs 
could consider a positive inheritance. Of course, the debate on enhancing 
vulnerability is in its infancy and public deliberation on it will grow as 
enhancement technologies advance. Nevertheless, in this weak version of 
transhumanism, Hauskeller’s and other authors’ concerns about vulnerability 
9 One of the most contentious debates on human enhancement of the last decade has been 
the issue of moral enhancement. Here, we leave open the possibility that the enhancement 
of the tendency to care can be inserted in that controversy. For a recent summary of the 
daunting ethical debate about moral enhancement, see Rueda (2020b, 281–285) and Rue-
da and Lara (2020). 
10 In this article, we leave out another important issue, which is that our institutions and 
societies can also be vulnerable. Moreover, our planetary existence might be considered 
as vulnerable, as recently postulated by Bostrom (2019) in his article The Vulnerable World 
Hypothesis concerning global existential risks. 
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should be deflated. Thereby, transhumanism may become an unexpected ally. 
The onus of proof is now on the opponents who want to deny it a welcome. 
4. Conclusion: celebrating (post)human vulnerability 
The idea of vulnerability leads to two acknowledgments. In its ontological 
sense, it recalls in the impossibility of becoming immune to harm and 
eventually death, as Hauskeller (2019) pointed out. In that sense, the search 
for invulnerability is wishful thinking. On the other hand, in its social 
meaning, it shows that we should not try to achieve complete invulnerability, 
because it is precisely the realization of vulnerability which allows us to 
take care of each other. We need to assess both sides of the coin concerning 
transhumanist projects. That said, the pivotal role of vulnerability does not 
prevent us from trying to reduce those vulnerabilities susceptible of being 
addressed by enhancement. Consequently, the types of vulnerabilities 
resulting from enhancement projects should be at the core of the debate 
about transhumanism.
Moreover, according to Hauskeller, vulnerability is something to be 
celebrated:
Now we can enjoy and celebrate being alive. And to the extent that being 
vulnerable in many different ways is part of being alive, we can also enjoy and 
celebrate our very vulnerability. […] That requires courage and a different sort 
of strength, not the strength of the autonomous and self-sufficient being that 
transhumanists long to become, but the strength of those who are brave enough 
to live with imperfection and adversity, who don’t shy away from the risk of 
getting hurt and who are mindful of the suffering of others. It is the strength 
of a vulnerable being that is not afraid of its own and others’ vulnerability 
(Hauskeller 2019, 19).
Celebrating vulnerability is a wise attitude in humans—the ephemeroi (i.e. 
those who live one day). Our finitude, our mortality, and our woundability 
are reminders of the fugacity and frailty of life: tempus fugit, we will perish 
sooner or later. The acknowledgment of those facts might prompt to live less 
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unsatisfied. After all, human vulnerability is not only a source of suffering, 
but also of joy; as Nussbaum (1986) explains, vulnerability is part of our 
condition as creative and open beings. 
We could even remind that vulnerability is not a human-exclusive cate-
gory. Transhumans or posthumans should not be deprived of it. Nick Bostrom 
(2005) defended in his seminal article In Defense of Posthuman Dignity that 
dignity is not exclusive of human beings, and that human dignity does not 
rival or compete against posthuman dignity, but both of them are actually 
compatible and complementary. We think that it should be the same with 
regard to the debate on vulnerability. Vulnerability can take multiple and 
unexpected forms depending on a multitude of factors that range from the 
pure chance to the realm of human actions. The differences and similarities 
between human vulnerability and the one future transhumans or posthumans 
may possess will depend on the choices we make. One thing is certain: at 
the least, they will be vulnerable—at the best, they will appreciate it.
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